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“Qui dit contractuel, dit juste”.1 This oft-cited quote by Fouillée in 1880 tempts people today 
to understand the early economic liberalism of the 19th Century as a system of unlimited lib-
eral freedom, which claimed that fairness would automatically result from a formal law of 
obligations based especially on formal equality.2 In her legal history postdoctoral lecture 
qualification Freiheit ohne Grenzen? (Unlimited Freedom?), Sibylle Hofer is prompted to 
examine the private law theory discussions of the 19th Century by the currently widely held 
view3 that in the 19th Century a theory of private law premised on unlimited individual free-
dom dominated. After studying a broad range of sources she comes to the conclusion that 
despite a large absence of discourse on contractual freedom this perception of “unlimited 
freedom” cannot be confirmed, instead this is more of a myth. In the 19th Century, the concept 
of private law under a paradigm of unlimited contractual freedom was [102] hardly ever sup-
ported. Rather, the myth of unlimited contractual freedom was constructed to be better able to 
attack the liberal conception in the course of the German Civil Code codification.4 To confirm 
this basic hypothesis, in the first part of her dissertation Hofer examines the 19th Century de-
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bate on the principles of private law, while in the second part she traces private autonomy in 
the individual building-blocks of property and obligations law such as will, trust or reliance 
and autonomy.5 In total she wants to uncover the discourse on the principle of “freedom” and 
the limits that already existed in early economic liberalism.6 This would prove that “the pri-
vate law conception at that time – apart from an insignificantly small number of exceptions – 
was in no way dominated by the idea of generally unlimited freedom.”7  
 
During her examinations of the 19th Century discourse on principles, Hofer first comes to the 
conclusion that the conception of a general freedom was hardly ever the topic of a legal dis-
course in the 1830s and 1840s. The old German law was still firmly caught up in structures 
based on class status, rendering it hardly possible to characterise it as free. Even when, in rare 
cases like Beseler,8 a notion of individual freedom could be discerned, the emphasis was 
placed on the limits to this freedom.9  
 
This finding can be confirmed by Bürge. He examined in detail the developments in private 
law in 19th Century France with a view to the historical economic context. The paradigm of 
private autonomy and the individualistic conception of the economic constitution could only 
assert themselves relatively late in the Second Empire (1848-1870) and then only gradually; 
private autonomy was diametrically opposed to the previous economic constitution. The new 
paradigm was received from German individualism and the historical legal school first and 
foremost in economically interested circles, which saw their economic ideas supported by 
these legal theories. Economic goals as well as philosophical and legal-theoretical support 
[103] were indistinguishable in this radically changing society.10 Bürge proves, in relation to 
France, that not until the 1830s and 1840s were changes to the Code Civile demanded to real-
 
 
 
5 Ibid., p. 155 f. 
6 Ibid., p. 12 f. 
7 Ibid., p. 275. 
8 Georg Beseler, 1809-1888, a.o. one of the fathers of the Paulskirchen-Verfassung (St. Paul’s Church Constitu-
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9 Ibid., p. 15 ff., especially p. 47 f. 
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enment was sought by Voltaire and Montesquieu, who advocated constitutionalism, liberty and prosperity and 
spoke out against taxation exemptions by virtue of wealth: Arblaster, The rise and decline of western liberalism 
(Oxford, 1986), p. 160 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
ise a liberal economic model where it had previously been completely enveloped in the étatis-
tic concept of economic constitution.11
 
In the 1850s jurists like Lenz,12 Jhering,13 C.A. Schmidt,14 and Röder,15 discussed the princi-
ples of Roman law and those of German law, and according to Hofer, in doing so they implic-
itly followed on from the work of Hegel, in so far as the Roman principles were confronted 
with the Christian principles. However, because these legal commentators considered them-
selves to be experiencing a phase of radical political change, Hegel’s negative notations on the 
Roman principles accordingly received little consideration.16 In the models which Hofer dis-
cerns in the legal discourse of the 1850s she sees freedom – even if not expressly dealt with – 
as implicitly recognised as a principle by these legal commentators. Different views among 
the authors examined existed only in so far as whether, and above all on what grounds limits 
should be placed on this basic freedom.17 For example, C.A. Schmidt provided for the limita-
tion of freedom by moral precepts, which were based on [104] Germanic principles like the 
Fraternitätsverhältnis (fraternal relationship); so for this reason the employer was obliged to 
take care of the “moral and physical well-being of the employee.”18 In contrast, in Jhering the 
limits to the principle of freedom can be found in the principle itself, in the freedom content 
of legal institutions.19 How far Jhering is allowing himself to be led by Kant’s moral freedom 
here and where he differs from it, remain unclear in Hofer.20  
 
 
 
 
11 Bürge, Das französische Privatrecht im 19. Jahrhundert zwischen Tradition und Pandektenwissenschaft, 
Liberalismus und Etatismus (Frankfurt a.M., 1991), p. 89 ff., p. 131 und p. 494 f. with further references.  
12 Gustav Lenz, 1818-1888, a.o. scholar of Gans and later an „enthusiastic admirer of Bismarck“: Hofer, 
Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), p. 58, Fn. 
78. 
13 Rudolf von Jhering, 1818-1892 After 1872 in Göttingen, where in the same year he held his presentation to 
the Wiener Juristischen Gesellschaft (Viennese Jurist’s Society) "Der Kampf ums Recht". In detail on Jhering: 
Wieacker, Rudolf von Jhering: eine Erinnerung zu seinem 50. Todestage (Leipzig, 1942). 
14 Carl Adolf Schmidt, Verfasser des Werkes: Schmidt, Der prinzipielle Unterschied zwischen römischem und 
germanischem Recht (Aalen/Rostock, 1964/1853). 
15 K.A. Röder, 1806-1879, focus in the area of criminal law theory, had to leave Giessen because of his 
"Grundzüge der Politik des Rechts" (1837): Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische 
Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), p. 66 f., Fn. 153. 
16 Ibid., p. 49 ff. 
17 Ibid., p. 72 f. 
18 Ibid., p. 50 ff. 
19 Ibid., p. 61 ff. und p. 72 f.  
20 Vgl. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Hamburg, 1993/1788), p. 60 ff., va. p. 60 f. and p. 64: The arbi-
trariness of one person is thereby limited solely by the arbitrariness of the other person and this as general law 
„thought of as objectively necessary because it is supposed to apply to everyone who has reason and will“. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
For the 1860s and 1870s too, although large “Pandekten” (pandect text books)21 appeared, 
Hofer has to admit that no debate on the principles of private autonomy took place among 
jurists. However, in this time period Hofer finds this debate on principles between econo-
mists, who also comment on contractual freedom. Strengthening socialism is fixed as the cen-
tral point of reference in the debate, which according to Wagner22 was causing the question of 
freedom and its rules to enter a new phase.23 Accordingly Hofer categorises the economists 
who commented on the structuring of the economic and legal order of the time as the “free 
trade school” on the one side and “Kathedersozialismus” (lectern socialism) on the other. The 
economic theories had positioned themselves in their distance to the idea of freedom in accor-
dance with these poles. Based on this point of reference, for the first time in this debate on 
economic freedom the discursive use of the term “contractual freedom” can be found.24 The 
important idea that individual freedom had to be determined according to the common inter-
ests at the time, held by national economists like Schmoller,25 had been adopted by jurists like 
Jhering and Gierke,26 [105] although according to Hofer, central points of these models re-
main unclear.27 Hofer finds the reason for this is to be that jurists like Gierke and Jhering, 
though they adopt common interests in their conception of private law, nonetheless refuse to 
give up the basic idea of individual freedom, so that the priority of both principles will have to 
be determined in a case-by-case weighing-up process.28
 
Finally, prompted by the draft of the German Civil Code 1896, Hofer finds a few authors tak-
ing part in a principles debate worthy of the name. Authors like Gierke, Menger and Baron 
 
 
 
21 With the pandects the separation of civic society and the state was meant to be encouraged by the reception of 
Roman law, which was transferred into national law in a systematised way and was thereby at the same time 
meant to realise the values of the Enlightenment and overcome the old order: Hattenhauer, Einführung zu: Thi-
baut und Savigny: ihre programmatischen Schriften (München, 1973), p. 33 ff. 
22 Adolph Wagner, 1835-1917, initially professor for political economics and finance in Vienna, after 1870 
Professor for political science in Berlin: Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen 
im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), p. 90 Fn. 135. 
23 Ibid., p. 74 ff., especially p. 98 f.  
24 Ibid., p. 98. 
25 Gustav Schmoller, 1838-1917, Nationalökonomie: Ibid., p. 87, Fn. 112. 
26 Otto von Gierke, 1841–1921, eminent German jurist and legal historian in Breslau, Heidelberg und Berlin. 
On Gierke see also Haack, Otto von Gierkes Kritik am ersten Entwurf des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (Diss.) 
(Göttingen, 1996) and Pfennig, Die Kritik Otto von Gierkes am ersten Entwurf eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches 
(Göttingen, 1997). 
27 Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), 
p. 107 ff., especially p. 130 f. 
28 Ibid., p. 130 f. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
(according to Hofer) followed on the economic principle debate of the 1860s and 1870s.29 
While Menger in his critique of the German Civil Code conceded that there existed a principle 
of freedom, which was limited by common interests, specifically the interests of the proper-
tyless classes, Gierke assumed an inherently limited freedom, meaning that the limits to free-
dom required no special justification. The common interest set the scope of freedom in the 
first place.30
 
Because in the first part of her work Hofer comes to the conclusion that an explicit principle 
debate on private autonomy and its limits was absent until the time of polarisation prompted 
by the draft German Civil Code, in the second part of her dissertation she traces private 
autonomy in the individual building blocks of the law of obligations and property law.31 She 
examines individual principles of the law of obligations and property law like intention, trust 
or reliance, and autonomy and comes to the same conclusion that she reached in the first part 
dealing with the principles discourse: although the legal commentators assume a, usually in 
principle and also limited, freedom, the underlying positions are not expressly stated.32
 
Hofer seeks at first to illustrate this hypothesis using the 19th Century concept of “unintended 
declaration.” A pure conception of individual autonomy would have [106] to deny validity to 
every declaration of intention that was made without the appropriate intention.33 However, the 
legal discourse around 1879-90 was dominated by conceptions, which although they were 
based on a principle of private autonomy, nevertheless assigned validity to an unintended dec-
laration in case of fault,34 or where it was in the interests of intercourse.35
 
 
 
29 Ibid., p. 132 ff. 
30 Ibid., p. 132 ff., especially S. 153 f. 
31 Ibid., p. 155 f. 
32 Ibid., p. 155 ff. 
33 Ernst Zitelmann, 1852-1923: Ibid., p. 169, Fn. 97.  
34 Bernhard Windscheid, 1817-1892, a.o. Member of the Commission for Preparation of the German Civil Code 
and an instrumental participant in these preparations. His major work is the Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (3 
Bde., 1862-1870), which had a great influence on the preparation of the German Civil Code. See in detail Falk, 
Ein Gelehrter wie Windscheid: Erkundungen auf den Feldern der sogenannten Begriffsjurisprudenz (Frankfurt 
a.M., 1989). See, also, Jhering, on autonomy and responsibility: Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: 
privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), p. 163 ff. and p. 184.  
35 Ferdinand Regelsberger, 1831-1911,the pandects can be characterised as his major work: Regelsberger, 
Pandekten (Berlin (Nachdruck: Goldbach), 1997/1893); Savigny, 1779-1861, founder of the “historischen 
Rechtsschule” and Prussian Minster; Rudolf Leonhard, 1851-1921, concerned himself mainly with the newly 
emerged BGB, and with reference to bona fide, Gustav Hartmann, 1835-1894, dealt with among other things the 
purpose idea in obligations law: Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), p. 180, Fn. 177, p. 181, Fn. 193 and p. 184 f. and p. 204  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
In a similar way Hofer finds the (implicit) rejection of unlimited private autonomy in the dis-
cussion on the definition of subjective law and obligation. Again, jurists like Savigny and 
Jhering emphasise that the force of will is limited by the interests of intercourse, although 
Hofer does not examine in depth which legal and societal context these interests of inter-
course are connected to exactly.36
 
Just as in Hofer’s exposition of the economic discussion of the 1860s, the chapter on the form 
of the limited property rights also touches on the societal context.37 Hence Hofer fixes the 
question of whether freedom exists in the establishment of limited property rights in the con-
text of emigration to the cities and the landowners’ credit crisis, in other words the context of 
the contemporary political and economic interests and events. The rejection of freedom in 
establishing property rights in the 1850s was mostly closely linked to legal-political demands 
for personal freedom (above all the liberation of the individual) and land freedom (above all 
the liberation of land) from enduring burdens.38 For the 1870s, however, Hofer observes a 
change in opinion. In the context of increasing emigration to the cities, various politically 
[107] interested jurists argued for a broadened contractual freedom in the sense that a wide-
ranging contractual limitation on the disposal of land should be possible.39
 
With this Hofer ascertains the non-existence of a legal, basic principles discourse on (contrac-
tual) freedom for the individual principles of property law and obligations law, just as ob-
served before in the discourse on principles. The silence of the sources applies with few ex-
ceptions as far as Menger’s and Gierke’s basic remarks/attacks in the setting of the draft Ger-
man Civil Code.40 Only under the precondition of this absent explicit discourse, however, 
which is Hofer’s central recognition, could an opposing position be created in the schematic 
categorisation of freedom which, particularly in the course of drafting the German Civil Code, 
could be fought against with serious consequences. The missing freedom discourse made at-
tacks by Gierke and Menger on private autonomy within the German Civil Code debate pos-
sible in the first place. Hence Gierke compared the free Romanistic model to his social Ger-
 
 
 
36 Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), 
p. 205 ff. 
37 Ibid., p. 74 ff. and p. 250 ff. 
38 Ibid., p. 260 and p. 274. 
39 Ibid., p. 259 ff. 
40 Ibid., p. 275. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
manic model, and in the same manner Menger built his criticism of the exploitation of the 
working classes on this radicalised picture.41
 
It is Hofer’s particular achievement to categorise various small and large principles of private 
law in the respective conceptions of the 19th Century jurists with reference to the emerging 
private autonomy. Hofer’s postdoctoral lecture qualification by means of her typification of 
private law conceptions forms a contribution to finding a way out of the often all-too sche-
matic comparison of freedom and compulsion in private law. Her work takes its place in an 
important finding by a number of authors, who describe the mechanical opposition of freedom 
and social as a myth and obsolete, whereby as far as “social” private law is concerned the 
question of either/or shifts to a question of quality.42 This is demonstrated with particular clar-
ity where the societal context of the time examined is illuminated, as in the examinations of 
the form of property rights. In around 1850, for the purpose of free enterprise mobilisation of 
land and labour, freedom was withdrawn so that land and labour could not be permanently 
withdrawn from the free market. Under the pressure of the societal crisis of emigration to the 
cities this mobilisation was slowed [108] down from the 1870s onwards in that under the 
name of contractual freedom stronger contractual commitments of property were again per-
mitted.43 Here, however, it is also demonstrated that the discourse on private autonomy with 
respect to its absence, cannot be understood without having regard to the social and above all 
the economic context. This context, which Hofer expressly closes off in her research starting 
point,44 is worth thinking about further. However, it is necessary to focus on relating legal 
 
 
 
41 Ibid., p. 2 and p. 275, additionally p. 50 ff. on C.A. Schmidt; cf. also Gierke, Die soziale Aufgabe des 
Privatrechts (Frankfurt a.M., 1948/1889); Menger, Das Bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Volksklassen 
(Tübingen/Goldbach, 1997/1904). 
42 Rückert, Zur Legitimation der Vertragsfreiheit im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Klippel (Hg.), Naturrecht im 19. 
Jahrhundert 135-183 (Goldbach, 1997), p. 144; Amstutz, Evolutorisches Wirtschaftsrecht: Vorstudien zum Recht 
und seiner Methode in den Diskurskollisionen der Marktgesellschaft (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 14 ff.; cf., p. 178 
ff. und p. 323 ff. 
43 On emigration to the cities in Switzerland see Bergier, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz von den Anfängen 
bis zur Gegenwart (Zürich, 1990), p. 258 f. and Balthasar/Gruner, Soziale Spannungen - wirtschaftlicher 
Wandel: Dokumente zur Schweiz zwischen 1880 und 1914 (Bern, 1989), S. 27 ff. On the importance of the great 
economic crisis, initiated by the Viennese stock market crash of 1873, for the private law conception see for 
example Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon Hill, 1957), p. 267 ff.; Brüggemeier, Entwicklung des 
Rechts im organisierten Kapitalismus (zwei Bände) (Frankfurt a.M., 1977-79), vol. I, p. 56 ff.; Hart, Zur konzep-
tionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 66-80 (1984), p. 71; cf. on all also 
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979), p. 571 ff. under the title "The Decline and Fall 
of Freedom of Contract: 1870-1970". 
44 Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 2001), 
p. 9 ff. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
principles and legal dogma in the larger context of societal development45 as well as tracing 
them back to their philosophical and general historical idea foundations46. The following hints 
should show the examination process which would be followed to gain a more extensive un-
derstanding of the private law conceptions examined by Hofer and to understand the absence 
of discourse on contractual freedom. 
 
The central, defining characteristic of the economic system that was installed in the course of 
the 19th Century, was, in a nutshell, the self-steering of the market through the mechanism of 
price. It was a significant innovation that the whole economy, including labour (and in part, 
land), was left to its own control and that the economy could thereby free itself from politics 
to this extent. Also, economics and the market were no longer “embedded” in society, but 
rather social relationships were decisively influenced by the market.47 The primacy of poli-
tics, according to Luhmann was changed to the economy,48 already described by Weber, 
1980/1921-25 as “universal [109] free-marketisation.”49 In particular, out of the need to pro-
spectively secure the means of production, including labour, arose the demand for the eco-
nomic system according to the credo of the classical liberal model50 that the economic system 
be left to its own devices; the prices of all goods would have to “find themselves” and imbal-
anced situations would repair themselves.51 From this arose the demand for the state not to 
 
 
 
45 Fundamentally Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), for example p. 382 ff. on good 
faith in business dealings or p. 398 ff. on subjective rights. 
46 So for example Rückert, Zur Legitimation der Vertragsfreiheit im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Klippel (Hg.), 
Naturrecht im 19. Jahrhundert 135-183 (Goldbach, 1997), p. 135 ff. 
47 Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon Hill, 1957), p. 77 ff.; similar already Weber, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), p. 398. 
48 Brüggemeier, Probleme einer Theorie des Wirtschaftsrechts, in: Assmann/Brüggemeier/Hart/Joerges (Hg.), 
Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts 9-81 (Bremen und Frankfurt a.M., 1980), p. 14 and p. 17 ff.; 
Luhmann, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts : Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (Frankfurt am Main, 
1999), p. 374 ff. 
49 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), p. 198. Corresponding to this in the second 
half of the 19th century the subsystem understood today as „economy“ was called „society“, which resulted in 
the misunderstood elements of the premise of “self-regulation of society” as a basic principle of private law: 
Luhmann, Einführung in die Systemtheorie (Heidelberg, 2002), p. 35. 
50 The term „classic liberal“ is used for the dominant liberal-economic school of thought during the short phase 
of a free market economy which found its end in the consequences of the great economic crisis from 1873 on-
wards: see on this in particular Brüggemeier, Probleme einer Theorie des Wirtschaftsrechts, in: Ass-
mann/Brüggemeier/Hart/Joerges (Hg.), Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts 9-81 (Bremen und Frankfurt 
a.M., 1980), p. 9 ff. 
51 On all of this: Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), p. 398 ff.; Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation (Beacon Hill, 1957), p. 62 ff. und 97 ff.; Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
(Oxford, 1979), p. 226 ff.; Brüggemeier, Probleme einer Theorie des Wirtschaftsrechts, in: 
Assmann/Brüggemeier/Hart/Joerges (Hg.), Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts 9-81 (Bremen und 
Frankfurt a.M., 1980), p. 14 ff. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
influence market direction, above all not through price-fixing, and also to protect market di-
rection from other influences, namely especially not to permit any income which did not come 
through income generated in market transactions.52 In this sense the co-operation of the state 
was constitutive for the emergence of free enterprise. This was a state organisation of private 
law rules in an economic and private-law centralised state, admittedly with the (in this sense 
paradoxical) aim of the free market as a distribution mechanism independent of the state.53 
Through the self-steering mechanism inserted by free enterprise the economy became an in-
dependent social field of modern society. Economic dealings were freed from moral, religious 
or familial references.54 As soon as the economy, through distinguishing itself from the com-
munication means of money especially and through a functioning labour market, was no 
longer inherently linked to and determined by events in society, contractual content could be 
released from law [110] into the hands of the economy, since now there was another means of 
discipline that could take over the function of controlling content – the market.55  
 
This overview of major directions in development can be confirmed with a glance at Switzer-
land’s economic history data. Through the new Swiss federal state of 1848 the preconditions 
for a market economy for all of Switzerland were created, in particular the single domestic 
market and freedom of movement, i.e. the mobilisation of labour, were politically disposed. 
The first federal constitution of 1848 created the single customs union and laid down a corre-
sponding freedom of goods and of establishment. Due to new foreign competition after 1848 
the economy was under heavy pressure to mechanise, and the lack of raw materials meant that 
Switzerland was dependent on good international relationships, accordingly it integrated itself 
early into free trade. Only in the second federal constitution of 1874, coinciding with the codi-
fication efforts for a Swiss law of obligations (in operation since 1883), was the uniform trade 
 
 
 
52 Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon Hill, 1957), p. 94 ff; cf. the liberal demand to eradicate all old 
privileges, i.e. all income not resulting from market transactions. 
53 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), p. 383 ff. and 499 ff.; Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation (Beacon Hill, 1957), p. 94 ff.; Brüggemeier, Probleme einer Theorie des Wirtschaftsrechts, in: 
Assmann/Brüggemeier/Hart/Joerges (Hg.), Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts 9-81 (Bremen und 
Frankfurt a.M., 1980), p. 14 f. 
54 Amstutz, Evolutorisches Wirtschaftsrecht: Vorstudien zum Recht und seiner Methode in den 
Diskurskollisionen der Marktgesellschaft (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 16 ff.; Rückert, Das BGB und seine 
Prinzipien, in: Zimmermann (Hg.), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB (Thübingen, 2002), N 14, 23, 29. 
55 Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M., 1993), p. 449 ff.; compare also Amstutz, 
Evolutorisches Wirtschaftsrecht: Vorstudien zum Recht und seiner Methode in den Diskurskollisionen der 
Marktgesellschaft (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 92 f. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
and commercial freedom fixed.56 This emergence of the economy and the erection of the free 
market was comprehended in law by the emergence of private law and its extensive closing 
off from influences other than economic ones. Through this exclusive structural coupling57 of 
law and economics by contract58, an express principle of private autonomy, in particular the 
freedom of obligations contracts, became superfluous.59
 
[111] Savigny’s much-cited statement, to which Hofer also makes reference, can now be clas-
sified in this context:60  
 
“… in financial circumstances the power of the law is asserted without regard to the moral or 
immoral exercise of a right. That is why the rich can let the poor perish by refusing support or 
exercising contract law harshly, and the assistance against this springs not from the soil of 
private law, but from that of public law; it lies in a poorhouse, which, however, the rich man 
can be compelled to contribute to, even if his contribution is perhaps not directly noticeable. It 
therefore remains nevertheless true, that no moral component can be attributed to “Ver-
mögensrecht” (property law) as an institute of private law, and by this claim neither the abso-
lute rule of moral laws is denied, nor the nature of private law placed in an ambiguous light 
…”61  
In Savigny extensive economic self-regulation is initially, in exceptional cases, corrected by 
public law institutions. Within private law limits to self-regulation arise essentially only if 
participation in the free market is permanently denied; private law when adapting its struc-
tures in limiting contractual freedom also primarily almost exclusively takes into considera-
tion the economy, in the form of “limits to freedom by freedom” or “limits to freedom by the 
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des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ZSR 113 I 409-432 (1994), p. 416 ff.; cf. Also Huf, Die sozialstaatliche Einbettung 
der Marktökonomie, ZfS Nr. 45 221-241 (1999), p. 223 f. 
57 A structural coupling exists when a system permanently assumes characteristics in its environment and relies 
on their stability in such a way that its own structures are connected to them. Structural couplings simultaneously 
limit and facilitate the influence of the environment on the system: Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frank-
furt a.M., 1993), p. 443 ff. 
58 According to Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (Oxford, 1995), p. 3 ff., from 1770-1870 the 
common law courts enforced the intention of the parties strictly and were there to enforce the contractual provi-
sions agreed upon by the parties, in the firm belief that enforcing private contracts was in the public interest.  
59 Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M., 1993), p. 458 ff.; Perels, Privatrechtssystem und 
Verfassungsstruktur in der Weimarer Republik (Diss.) (Frankfurt a.M., 1973), p. 10. 
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p. 206 ff. 
61 Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Bd. 1-4 (Berlin, 1973/1840), Vol I, p. 371. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
requirements of commerce,” with reference to the newly-realised free domestic market in par-
ticular.62 Through the exclusive referral of contract law to the economy, the law, according to 
Luhmann, achieves the modern form of structural coupling to the economy.63  
 
Though only sketched in an overview the following context led to changes in the private law 
system. In the wake of the great economic crisis from 1873 onwards the liberal-economic 
presumption that the free market would balance out and keep the promises made, above all 
growth, full employment and stability, was increasingly called into question.64 Following the 
economic crisis an increasing Vermachtung (emphasis on power relationships) of the econ-
omy was discerned, that called into [112] question the liberal-economic premise of self-
regulation and self-repair of the free market and simultaneously attracted attention to the fac-
tual inequalities of market participants (mainly between companies and non-organised per-
sons) as already raised for example by Lotmar and Gierke.65 After all, through the constitu-
tion of the free domestic market new population groups were being integrated into the for-
mally egalitarian free market, whereby the “practical universalisation of market commerce” 
had received a difficult extension. Through the increasing existential emergencies and fears of 
labouring people during the economic crisis as well as the simultaneous development of a 
“class consciousness” the legal protection of the existential and at the same time economic 
independence of these population groups became the centre of political attention.66
 
 
 
62 cf. Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 
2001), p. 206 ff. 
63 Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M., 1993), p. 458 ff. 
64 Brüggemeier, Entwicklung des Rechts im organisierten Kapitalismus (zwei Bände) (Frankfurt a.M., 1977-
79), Vol I, p. 56 ff.; Hart, Zur konzeptionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 66-
80 (1984), p. 71. 
65 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), p. 503 f.; Brüggemeier, Probleme einer 
Theorie des Wirtschaftsrechts, in: Assmann/Brüggemeier/Hart/Joerges (Hg.), Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des 
Privatrechts 9-81 (Bremen und Frankfurt a.M., 1980), p. 38 f. and p. 46. on situations of structural inequality see 
Lotmar, Der Dienstvertrag im Entwurf des Zivilgesetzbuches, in: Rehbinder (Hg.), Philipp Lotmar: 
Schweizerisches Arbeitsvertragsrecht, Forderungen an den Gesetzgeber 119-147 (Bern, 1991/1905), p. 43 f.; on 
'Vermachtung' of the economy see Gierke, Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (Frankfurt a.M., 1948/1889) p. 
18 ff. and 41 ff. 
66 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, 1980/1921-25), p. 503; Wiethölter, Rechtswissenschaft 
(Basel/Franfurt a.M., 1986/1968), p. 180 ff.; Hart, Zur konzeptionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts, Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 66-80 (1984), p. 70 f.; just as Rückert, Das BGB und seine Prinzipien, in: 
Rückert/Schmoeckel/Zimmermann (Hg.), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB; Band I: Allgemeiner Teil 
§§ 1-240 zweites Kapitel (Tübingen, 2003), N 105; see also Tanner, Industrialisierung, Familienökonomie und 
Hungererfahrung: Sozialkonflikte, Arbeitskämpfe und Konsumboykott in der Schweiz 1880-1914, in: 
Gailus/Volkmann (Hg.), Der Kampf um das tägliche Brot: Nahrungsmangel, Versorgungspolitik und Protest 
1770-1990 233-257 (Lengerich, 1994), p. 255 ff., who refers to the societal focus on the wages of factory 
workers during industrialisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
Not until the influence of politics under the motif “social” entered alongside and in opposition 
to the almost exclusive ties of private law to the economy did (as Luhmann had already ar-
gued) contractual freedom find a continual entrance to private legal discourse. Only from this 
time on, in contrast to Savigny’s concept, was the question of the structural coupling of pri-
vate law to the economy raised with force. This was done concretely, for example, in the 
question of which legal rules within contract law were dispositive and which compulsory. 
This explains after all the extensive silence of the sources in the 19th Century found by 
Hofer.67 The unique adoption in the German-speaking codification process of an express free-
dom of contract in Art. 19 Abs. 1 of the Swiss contract law occurred only its revision in 1905-
11 and not at the emergence of contract law in 1881. The adoption of contractual freedom in 
the codification is to be seen in this context of the new political intervention in contractual 
content and the new alternative coupling of [113] private law to politics, not, however, as an 
early culmination of contractual freedom as the dominant principle of contract law. 
 
With this social-societal background Luhmann is to be referenced, particularly with respect to 
his legal-historical explanations of “law as a social system,” which comes to a similar and yet 
at the same time contradictory conclusion as Hofer.68 Luhmann points out that the concept of 
contractual freedom does not appear until politics tries in a higher degree to control the recip-
rocal irritation of legal and economic systems. Luhmann, however, in contrast to Hofer sus-
pects that the concept of contractual freedom was invented “as for defence against state inter-
vention, especially in labour law and cartel (anti-trust) law.”69 Until then, a structural cou-
pling of law and economics had existed, in that “the contract, expressed extremely formally, is 
nothing else than the agreement of the declarations of intention of the parties concluding the 
contract,”70 whereas the subsystem of politics has temporarily withdrawn to an observation 
position.71 However, from the point of view of the law the primary structural link to econom-
ics has been replaced by a simultaneous coupling to economics and, through compulsory con-
tract law, to politics, which is mainly responsible for enacting compulsory norms:  
 
 
 
 
67 cf. Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen?: privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 
2001), p. 275 f. 
68 Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M., 1993). 
69 Ibid., p. 465 ff., mainly p. 468. 
70 Ibid., p. 461. 
71 Ibid., p. 467. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
”The structural coupling of the legal and economic systems [mainly through contract] be-
comes a medium for the medium political power, that means a loose coupling of possibilities 
which can be brought into politically acceptable forms by collectively binding decisions [for 
example by compulsory norms in contract law]. For the sake of the hoped-for economic ef-
fects the use of property and contractual freedom are continually subjected to stronger legal 
limits.”72
 
What can we gain from such recognitions? Alongside many other things, the following. To-
day, in the age of reformulation of political tasks and privatisation,73 especially under the 
pressure of globalisation74 and technologisation,75 because [114] tasks are increasingly being 
performed by private actors it is urgently necessary to show that unlimited private autonomy 
is only a myth. At the same time, however, it must be emphasised that the original conception 
of economic law was almost exclusively directed at the constitution of a free domestic market, 
in which initially only a small fraction of the population participated.76 However, after the 
integration of further population groups and trade areas of society into the free market this 
“pure” economic system could no longer be maintained. Rather, from then on it was a matter 
of the precarious balance between autonomy and intervention, that private law saw itself as 
maintaining in regard to self-regulating markets. This remarkable responsiveness, that private 
law had already developed by around 1900 pertaining to the autonomy of the economic sys-
tem and its associated social issues, can serve today as the great historical role-model for the 
relationship of law to other (new) autonomous areas of civil society. In the words of Teubner: 
Today, especially, it is a matter of institutionalising the precarious balance between autonomy 
and intervention that private law saw itself as maintaining in respect of self-regulating mar-
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kets in other autonomous fields of civil society as well. Neither an overly strong coupling to 
the economy nor political intervention is the agenda of the future, but rather a variety of struc-
tural couplings to the different sectors of civil society.77
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